Since the first weeks of January, an important topic in Italian public debate has been the deployment of three frigates in the Red Sea, as part of an international response to the attacks carried by the Houthis against merchant ships in the area. While this is an operation aiming primarily at securing freedom of navigation through the area and the resuming of regular commercial transit in an area that is vital to national interests, it has nonetheless sparked criticism from those who regarded it as an act of aggression, therefore unconstitutional, or an act of subservience to foreign interests, or still as something ineffective, bound to result in a further failure.
However, while one can criticise the operation in itself and the Italian involvement for how it has been structured, it would be hard to argue that the Red Sea is not an area of primary interests for Rome, thus justifying the intervention. The present analysis will therefore go further and argue that, beyond the fundamental protection of Italian economic and strategic interests in the region, this operation represents the opportunity for Italy to demonstrate strength in its immediate neighbourhood, affirming its role as guarantor of peace and stability in what the Italian Navy’s strategic language calls the Enlarged Mediterranean. In doing so, it will initially look at the background of the region and then at Italy’s strategic priorities, to then develop the above mentioned argument for a more energic involvement in the operation.
Troubled Waters: the Instability in the Bab El-Mandeb Strait
Despite the economic and strategic importance of the Red Sea, its shores have a longstanding history of conflict and instability and ever since its independence, Yemen made no exception. Indeed, its recent history presents a succession of coups, insurrections and civil conflicts, partly favoured by its division between different tribes and between two main religious groups: one Sunni, overall majoritarian and dominant in the South and in the West and the Shia, predominant instead in the Northwestern part of the country. Ruled as an authoritarian regime led by the Sunni from 1994, the country fell into a civil war as a result of the Arab Spring and currently finds itself divided between the Sunni, Western-backed government, based in Aden and the Shia, Iran-backed government based in the former capital, Sana’a.
For what concerns the current escalation, instead, it came as a direct result of the conflagration of the latest conflict between Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, and Israel, from October 2023. Following the initial Hamas offensive into Israeli territory and the subsequent Israeli counteroffensive into Gaza, which is claiming tens of thousands of Palestinian lives, the Houthis, i.e. the Shia militias controlling the Eastern part of Yemen, launched a serie of raids against Western commercial ships transiting through the region, in order to pressure the Western country to reduce support to Israel. As this traffic counts for nearly 40% of European-Asian trade, decision of shipping companies to abandon the Red Sea in favour of the longer Cape Route (passing through South Africa), inevitably led to economic downturns, which quickly brought the United States and its allies to decide for military intervention. This intervention took the shape of two missions: one NATO-backed called Prosperity Guardian, led by the USA and the UK, the other, this time EU-backed, called Aspides, of which Italy is a part.
Trapped in the Mediterranean: Italy’s Delicate Position
The reasons for this article’s argument for Italy’s intervention in the region follow two main criteria: one geopolitical and strategic, the other economic.
Starting from the former, it is based on Italy’s geographical position at the centre of the Mediterranean Sea, an area of transit for most exchanges between Europe and from the North American Atlantic Coast and the East. Aside from this, the historical role of the Mediterranean Sea as an area of flow of wealth, which has made it the object of competition between great powers, has always forced Italy, as an important gateway from and to the region, to face an imperative: either to assume a dominating position, or to end up overwhelmed by other, stronger powers (Bonamico 1937). This was a question that re-emerged with strength in the aftermath of the Unification, when the newborn Kingdom of Italy, with its land-oriented ruling class, had to come to terms with the importance of the Sea (Ibid).
The role of the Red Sea and of the Suez Canal here is self-evident. This is indeed the gate to and from the Mediterranean Sea; an area that, for its contained dimensions and the instability of its shores is extremely fragile and, just like for the Gibraltar Strait, an actor that should be able to close it could bring upon the ruin of all the countries in the region. In the strategic vocabulary, a choke point. This is sufficient to explain why it is vital that any attempts at blockading either Suez or the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, which gives access from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, are to be met with implacable strength.
Shifting now to the economic perspective, the figures that will follow will largely confirm the geopolitical and strategic considerations above. Starting from the broader data, estimates show that traffic along the Bab El-Mandeb Strait/Suez Canal Route count for 12% of global trade and more than, as already said, over 40% of Europe to Asia maritime trade. To exemplify the fragility of the region, if can be sufficient to remind when in 2021 a Taiwanese cargo ship ran aground and paralysed the Suez Canal for a week, paralysing global trade and provoking losses for tens of billions of dollars.
Looking now specifically at Italy, estimates from the Bank of Italy and Confindustria show that Italy’s economic losses count for € 95 million daily, and nearly € 8.8 billion, during the last three months. An information to which one might add that 52% of the total value of Italian maritime import passes through that route. All of this not only confirms the previous argument on the strategic importance of the sea, but also expands it: it does not merely concern existential, military threats, but also economic ones, which have a just as equivalent potential to bring a country to its knees.
The Case for Greater Italian Involvement
The considerations above should have made clear why for Italy, regardless of the political faction in charge, it is impossible not to partake in the securitisation of the Red Sea. It is indeed a question of defending the country’s national interests and economic prosperity in an already difficult moment, rather than of ideology or of loyalty to international affiliations, which while certainly playing a role, here fully coincide with the most nation-centred arguments.
Proven the inevitability of involvement, an important component of the debate concerns the kind of participation to be put in place. The first and easier way would have been through diplomatic effort, avoiding a direct military participation. This may have preserved Italy’s relations with the Houthi’s and the Iranian-backed bloc, useful for the sake of keeping a mediator role, but under those circumstances could result counterproductive. First, it would represent a display of weakness, as other local powers, including competing ones, would perceive Italy as unwilling and unable to enforce its own interests when needed, thus harming its credibility. Second, it would leave the country dependent on the allies’ efforts, reinforcing the previous point and giving the image of a country incapable of exercising its own sovereignty. Third, it would be a lost opportunity to exercise a leading role in what the Italian Navy strategic language identifies as the Enlarged Mediterranean, this being the most vital geographic region for Italy’s very existence and survival.
The military solution, was therefore the only viable one here. As a land operation would be undesirable and impracticable, other than illegal, the focus here remains therefore on naval and air operations, the objective being ending the attacks and guaranteeing a safe navigation through the Red Sea. Pursuing implies annihilating the enemy’s willingness and ability to carry on the attacks, which in turn can be obtained in two ways: by blockading Yemeni ports, making it impossible for Iran to supply weapons to its allies and at the same time neutralising the means through which the Houthis can launch their attacks. Here, the decentralised structure of the Houthi Militias, combined with a military doctrine largely focused on mobility and o hiding equipment and manpower from air raids, makes it hard to hit directly at their combat capabilities. This in turn, makes it preferable the above mentioned approach, hittin through blockade and infrastructure destruction their ability and willingness to fight.
By early February, Italy has decided not to partake the NATO-backed Prosperity Guardian Mission, thus renouncing to the intelligence collaboration with the UK and the USA, but has joined the EU mission Aspides, along with France and Germany, of which it will have the tactical command. The Italian force deployed consists of two Bergamini-class frigates, equipped with cruise missiles, and depending on the variant, either A2/AD* or ASW** capabilities and an Orizzonte-class missile destroyer, which tonnage and weaponry make it de facto classifiable as a missile cruiser. As the mission takes shape, this is, along with the tactical command, a significant diplomatic success, notwithstanding the fact that air capabilities will be provided by the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle. Success, which is imperative, can potentially relaunch Italy as a leading actor in guaranteeing security in the Mediterranean Region.
Conclusion
To conclude, diplomacy should never be abandoned, even in such circumstances; however, it may first be necessary to create the conditions for its application, inexistent if maritime trade and the economy of three continents continues being disrupted. This is a matter of international security that, as said, goes beyond, ideological or partisan political dynamics. Here, with all its limits, the launching of a European mission in collaboration, but separate from the UK and the US is a development that if successful can become an important step towards greater European military integration. The upcoming months, as the international landscape remains volatile and unstable, will show whether or not this may be the case.
Glossary
*A2/AD: Anti-Air/Area Denial
** ASW: Anti-submarine Warfare
Works Cited
Bonamico, Domenico, and Guido Po. Il Problema Marittimo Dell’Italia ; Il Potere Marittimo. Edizioni Roma, 1937.
Photo by Mark Fletcher-Brown on Unsplash
