90 seconds.
90 seconds to midnight.
This is what the Doomsday Clock’s hands indicated at the start of the new year. The closest to global catastrophe we have ever been.
The Doomsday Clock was invented in 1947 by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. It is a tool which uses a symbolic image to represent the nuclear apocalypse: the clock reaching midnight. The Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, which comprises ten Nobel laureates, consults with its Board of Sponsors each year to set the Doomsday Clock, according to threats to peace and security in the real world (“Current Time”). The Doomsday Clock has become an internationally recognized indication of humanity’s vulnerability to global disasters induced by man-made technology (“Current Time”).
Is nuclear war more close to reality today than it was during the Cold War? Let’s look at some recent events…
At the end of October 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed legislation withdrawing Russia’s ratification of the worldwide treaty barring nuclear weapons testing (Osborn). Separately he has also proclaimed that Russia would suspend participation in another nuclear pact known as the “NEW Start” (Osborn). These events, taking into context Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine, paint a rather negative picture of where the nuclear threat scene sits today. Instead of making progress towards denuclearization, it seems the world is going towards becoming more nuclear-loaded than ever. And it is important to realize it is not only about Putin. North Korea keeps testing its missiles, the United States keep modernizing its arsenal, and for the first time, an Israeli minister indirectly admitted to nuclear capability when admitting “the use of nuclear weapons” on Gaza was a possibility.
Nuclear weapons are still at the core of every nuclear power strategic doctrine…
Nuclear weapons, unlike chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and cluster bombs, are not universally outlawed. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 provides only limited bans (mostly for governments that do not yet have nuclear weapons), while nuclear-weapon-free zone accords prohibit nuclear weapons exclusively in certain geographical zones. The only existing treaty, outlawing nuclear weapons, is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which only a month ago hosted its second meeting. However, among countries holding nuclear armament, none of them are signatories, therefore they are not subjected to its objectives.
The TPNW is the first legally binding international agreement to fully prohibit nuclear weapons, with the ultimate objective of their eradication. It was enacted on July 7, 2017, opened for signatures on September 20, 2017, and goes into effect on January 22, 2021. The Treaty contains a complete list of restrictions on any nuclear weapon activity (UNODA). These include promises not to develop, test, manufacture, acquire, hold, stockpile, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons (UNODA). Among other obligations, state parties are required to prevent and suppress any action forbidden by the TPNW that is carried out by individuals or on territory under their authority or control (UNODA).
Its 2nd Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York City from November 27 to December 1 (Knight). The meeting concluded with state parties agreeing on a joint declaration and package of decisions (Knight). The consensus joint declaration, which challenged long-held assumptions of nuclear deterrence theory and confirmed the security threats it posed, was arguably the most significant conclusion of the meeting (Knight).
The parties agreed that nuclear deterrence is a primary security issue, that requires the urgent attention of the international community and that more data on the impact of nuclear weapons and their consequences are necessary (“Armi nucleari”)
On point 19 of the Draft resolution coming out of the meeting the parties remark:
“The perpetuation and implementation of nuclear deterrence in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies not only erodes and contradicts non – proliferation, but also obstructs progress towards nuclear disarmament”
It is well acknowledged that the nuclear weapon states and their allies view nuclear deterrence as the single most important justification for maintaining nuclear weapons (Hanson). However, three decades after the end of the Cold War is it still pertinent to blindly trust the doctrines of nuclear deterrence?
Because decades have passed, and the world we live in today has changed immensely, it is only reasonable to question the Cold War notion of deterrence. This is not to say that nuclear weapons had no role in sustaining peace in the Cold War and its aftermath, but rather that the absence of direct war between major powers during this period was attributable to also several other factors (Doyle 14). Deterrence is not a proven theory. It is just an assumption that we have been taking as accurate. However, there is no way to prove it. What has been described as “prolonged peace” in Europe could also be simply the product of a historical process (Doyle 14). And the war in Ukraine gave us reason to further investigate this assumption.
The inherent fragility of deterrence must never be overlooked (Wieseltier). Its core irony, that what has the strongest potential to harm us is also what we rely on for peace, is truly baffling (Wieseltier). Deterrence it’s at the core of every nuclear weapons discussion. The narrative is always about the first strike, strategy, precisions, and missiles.
Then what about the devastating consequences?
There is still an information gap between what would happen in the event of a nuclear war and the policies of nuclear-armed governments and their allies (ICAN). Deterrence is based on the threat of unleashing a nuclear war with an unthinkable number of casualties and damage. Yet, the discussion among great powers is always focused on strategy and security, and never on deaths and destruction.
If deterrence fails, millions, if not hundreds of millions, of people might be killed in a matter of hours (Doyle 20). Without weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of armed conflict would be substantially less disastrous, also amongst countries with incredible forces (Doyle 20). At the end of the day, expecting that increased deterrence would lead to peace, is just an assumption, even if broadly held. It is an assumption that flirts with danger. Because nuclear weapons cannot be unconceived, their catastrophic repercussions should at least keep the world ethically committed to never taking their non-use for granted.
Works cited
“Armi nucleari, i Paesi aderenti al Trattato sulla messa al bando delle armi atomiche condannano la dottrina della deterrenza.” 2023. Repubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/emergenza/2023/12/02/news/armi_nucleari_i_paesi_aderenti_al_trattato_sulla_messa_al_bando_delle_armi_atomiche_condannano_la_dottrina_della_deterrenza-421560296/.
“Current Time – 2023.” n.d. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog). Accessed January 19, 2024. https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/.
Doyle, James E. 2013. “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” Survival 55 (1): p. 7–34. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.767402?needAccess=true
Osborn, Andrew. 2023. “Putin Revokes Russian Ratification of Global Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” Reuters, November 2, 2023, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-revokes-russias-ratification-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-2023-11-02/.
“Second Meeting of States Parties Agrees Nuclear Deterrence Is the Problem.” n.d. ICAN. https://www.icanw.org/tpnw_2msp_conclusion.
“Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – UNODA.” n.d. https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/.
Wieseltier, Leon. 1985. “When Deterrence Fails.” Foreign Affairs 63 (4): 827–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/20042288.
Photo by Egor Myznik on Unsplash
